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In this paper, I present an alternative account of action that improves upon what 
has come to be known as the standard story. The standard story depicts actions 
as events that are caused by and made intelligible through the appropriate 
combinations of the agent’s beliefs, desires, decisions, intentions and other 
motivational factors. I argue that the standard story is problematic because it 
depicts the relation between the agent and their bodily actions as causally 
mediated by their motivational factors. On the alternative account that I present, 
whenever an agent performs a bodily action, they do so by exerting a distinctive 
kind of effort so as to initiate, sustain, and control their own bodily capacities, 
an essential feature of bodily action that is absent from the standard story.   
 
 
The Standard Story of Action 
 
The standard story of action
1
 occupies a prominent yet controversial 
place in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy of mind and action, one 
whose roots trace back at least to the work of Donald Davidson and 
subsequent modifications suggested by the likes of Michael Bratman, David 
Velleman, and many others.
2
 At its heart, the standard story depicts bodily 
actions as events that are caused by and made intelligible through the 
appropriate interactions between the agent’s motivational factors, including 
their beliefs, desires, and intentions. Thus, the standard story is an event-
causal account of bodily action, insofar as a particular action is understood 
to be a discrete event that is caused in the appropriate way by the onset of 
the motivational factors that render that action intelligible, where the onset 
of the relevant motivational factors within the agent is an event that stands 
in the appropriate causal relation with the bodily events that comprise the 
action in question.     
                                                 
1
 The expression ‘the standard story’ was used by J. David Velleman in Velleman 1992.  
2
 See, for example, Davidson 2001, Bratman 1999 and Velleman 2000.   
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For our purposes here, we can set aside a number of problems that 
proponents of the standard story have attempted to address, such as that of 
describing the conditions under which the relevant motivational factors can 
be said to cause the subsequent bodily events in the right way, or that of 
specifying the precise nature, content, and causal role of the motivational 
factors themselves.
3
 Instead, the problem that will interest us here concerns 
the way in which the standard story depicts the relation that obtains 
between the agent and the bodily actions that they perform in light of the 
motivational factors that render their action intelligible. I will argue that the 
standard story misconstrues this relation by insisting that it must be 
mediated solely by the onset of the relevant motivational factors.   
 
A Problem for the Standard Story 
 
Imagine the following scenario. One day not too long ago, I decided 
to run a marathon. Before coming to make this decision, I deliberated about 
the motivational factors that support my doing so and compared them with 
those that support my refraining from doing so. After this process of 
deliberation, I decided that the motivational factors that support my running 
of the race were rationally stronger than those that do not, so I formed an 
intention to run the race and embarked upon an ambitious training plan. 
Today is the day of the race and the relevant conditions are normal but 
while running the last mile of the marathon, I find myself confronted with a 
tremendously powerful desire to stop. I am in pain, I am exhausted nearly to 
the point of collapse, I desperately desire to stop, and I come to believe that 
these newfound motivational factors that suggest that I stop running are 
rationally stronger than my previous ones. However, in spite of this, I 
manage to overcome this potent desire and the accompanying belief and 
finish the race, thereby displaying what we can call ‘strength of will’.4 How 
do I manage to overcome such persistent and powerful motivational factors 
and continue to perform the action in question?     
On the standard story, we can explain the situation as follows: in 
normal conditions and when all goes well, my running of the marathon is 
caused by the appropriate interactions between those of my motivational 
                                                 
3
 For discussion of the former, see, for example, Peacocke 1979; for discussion of the latter, 
see, for example, Dancy 2000. 
4
 I borrow this notion from Richard Holton. See Holton 1999, 2003 and 2009.    
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factors that make intelligible my doing so, where the relevant motivational 
factors exert the requisite causal force in virtue of their superior rational 
strength. Thus, on the standard story, those motivational factors that are 
rationally strongest also exert the strongest causal force, thereby moving my 
body in the required manner for the duration of the marathon.
5
 But at the 
moment when I am confronted with the tremendously powerful desire to 
stop running and the belief that my newly acquired motivational factors are 
rationally stronger than my previous ones, the original motivational factors 
that explained and caused my running of the race are no longer rationally 
strongest, so according to the standard story they can no longer cause me to 
run. It follows, then, that I must stop running. The standard story thus rules 
out the possibility that I might exert effort while struggling to resist my 
newly acquired motivational factors as I force myself to continue running 
through the pain and discomfort.                
In order to explain the fact that I can overcome the strongest of my 
motivational factors at a given moment in time, we need to make room for 
the distinctive sort of effort that I can exert in the process of overcoming a 
desire and belief that threatens to thwart my performance of an action as I 
continue to perform it. In such conditions, since the original motivational 
factors that explained and caused my performance of that action have lost 
their superior rational strength, they cannot explain my continued running; 
and since I continue to run in spite of the potency of my newfound 
motivational factors that suggest I stop running, they cannot explain and 
cause my continued running either. Something else must explain the fact 
that I continue to use the relevant bodily capacities in the midst of this 
struggle. I suggest that this additional feature can be understood in terms of 
the effort that I exert in using the relevant bodily capacities, an effortful 
struggle that cannot be reduced to the motivational factors that are at play in 
the standard story, and which can be explained by postulating the existence 
of a distinctive causal power that I use when exerting the effort required to 
initiate, sustain and control my bodily capacities in the performance of an 
action. The effort that is required in the use of bodily capacities is not 
obvious in every case, but it is present nonetheless and its presence is 
especially manifest in (1) cases of paralysis and (2) the distinction between 
                                                 
5
 Davidson is explicit about this aspect of the standard story. See Davidson 2001, xvi: “if 
reasons [what I am calling ‘motivational factors’] are causes, it is natural to suppose that the 
strongest reasons [i.e., motivational factors] are the strongest causes.” 
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the active and passive relations in which an agent can stand with their own 




Consider first the notion of paralysis. In conditions of paralysis, effort 
can be manifested as such in the failure to bring about an action. For 
example, imagine someone who is awakening from surgery after having 
been administered a general anaesthetic and muscle relaxant, and who has 
yet to realise their present condition. Imagine further that in this state of 
disordered ignorance, they attempt to perform a basic bodily action such as 
moving a finger or opening their mouth. In such conditions, by attempting 
to perform the basic action in question this person can come to the sudden 
and perhaps frightening realisation that they remain paralysed.
7
 In coming 
to this realisation, they become aware of their failed effort to activate a 
bodily capacity. Crucially, in attempting to activate the relevant bodily 
capacity, they are doing something, namely, exerting effort in their failed 
attempt to activate a bodily capacity, but they are not performing the basic 
bodily action in question. In such cases there will be some kind of event 
occurring as they engage in the failed effort to activate a bodily capacity, 
something that occurs as a direct causal consequence of their making the 
failed effort in such strange circumstances, but the event will not be the 
basic action that the agent is attempting to perform. By attempting but 
failing to perform a basic bodily action in circumstances of this kind, the 
agent can come to the realisation that they are exerting effort to activate the 
relevant capacity.
8
     
  Consider next the contrast between the active and passive relations in 
which an agent can stand with their own bodily capacities. The contrast is 
most obvious when comparing distinct scenarios where the same type of 
bodily capacity is activated but only in one of the scenarios does the agent 
themself activate the capacity. For example, compare a situation in which 
someone’s leg twitches or spasms, with a situation in which that person 
                                                 
6
 Note that the sense in which effort is ‘present’ is not one in which such effort must figure in 
or otherwise be registered by the agent’s conscious experience when they are engaged in the 
performance of an action.   
7
 There are cases like this called ‘anaesthesia awareness’ or ‘intraoperative awareness’.  
According to the American Society of Anesthesiologists, such cases occur approximately one 
to two times per every thousand uses of general anaesthesia.       
8
 A parallel account can be given of paralysis in the case of mental actions, but I set that aside 
for the sake of brevity.   
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moves the very same leg in a superficially similar way. In the former 
situation, the agent stands in a distinctively passive relation with the 
capacities that enable them to move their leg. Such cases can be described 
in this manner precisely because the agent does not activate the relevant 
capacities; the leg twitches or jerks without their doing anything. By 
contrast, in the latter situation the agent stands in a distinctively active 
relation with those very same capacities, and we can describe the agent as 
controlling their leg as they move it, however briefly or sporadically. Such 
cases can be described in this manner precisely because the agent stands in 
an active relation with the movement of their leg through exerting the effort 
required to employ the relevant bodily capacities.
9
   
Thus far, I hope to have made a plausible case for the claim that even 
in the performance of mundane bodily actions there is something that the 
agent does in order to bring those actions into being. In particular, I have 
claimed that the agent must exert effort in order to initiate, sustain, and 
control the activation and employment of the relevant capacities, however 
brief in duration this might be. When doing so, the agent employs effort as a 
means by which the action in question is brought into being, and, crucially, 
their doing so is something that they cause. The effort in question is what 
goes missing in the standard story of action.  
 
An Alternative Account of Action 
 
As it has thus far been described, the alternative account of action 
highlights the importance of the distinctive kind of effort that an agent must 
exert in the performance of a bodily action. The effort in question has a 
specific function, namely, that of enabling the agent causally to initiate, 
sustain, and control his or her own bodily capacities in the performance of 
an action. When performing an action, the agent exerts effort so as to 
activate the relevant bodily capacities, an exertion on the part of the agent 
that is active but not an independent or isolable event. The exertion of such 
effort is what distinguishes the active and passive relations in which an 
agent can stand with their capacities, and is what is present when an agent 
tries but fails to perform an action in cases of paralysis, and is what enables 
                                                 
9
 A parallel account of the distinction between the active and passive relations in which an 
agent stands with their own cognitive capacities can be given, but I set that aside for the sake of 
brevity. 
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the agent to continually perform an action in cases where they display 
strength of will. Crucially, since such effort is a causal phenomenon, the 
exertion of effort by the agent always brings about some event or other, 
both in cases of successful action and in cases of paralysis. And since 
neither the agent nor the effort exerted by the agent is an event of any kind, 
the causal relation that obtains between them is not one between distinct 
events, and the agent’s exertion of effort is not itself an independent or 
isolated event of any kind. Rather, the causal relation is one of the 
actualisation of a disposition that has a characteristic range of effects, like 
that of an iron magnet when attracting particular kinds of metals, or that of 
the spontaneous radioactive decay of an atomic nucleus.
10
 Equally as 
crucially, the effort by which the agent initiates, sustains, and controls their 
capacities in the performance of bodily actions is neither a bodily nor a 
cognitive capacity. It is not a bodily or cognitive capacity because (1) its 
exertion has a unique range of characteristic effects that differ in kind from 
that of bodily and cognitive capacities, and (2) unlike bodily and cognitive 
capacities, effort cannot be exerted by anything or anyone other than the 
agent. That is to say, although bodily and cognitive capacities are 
understood as dispositions the actualisations of which have characteristic 
effects, their effects are different in kind from each other and also from that 
of the effort exerted by the agent. Roughly put, in the case of bodily 
capacities, their actualisation consists in the distinctive movements of 
particular bodily parts, such as when an agent moves their legs as they walk; 
in the case of cognitive capacities, their actualisation consists in 
representational content coming to mind in a capacity-specific way, such as 
when a thought comes to mind in the process of recalling a fact about the 
past.
11
 Both types of capacity can be actualised by the agent or by factors 
that are external to the agent. When the agent through their exertion of 
effort actualises such a capacity, an action occurs; when someone or 
something other than the agent actualizes such a capacity, a superficially 
                                                 
10
 For a useful account of the notions of a disposition and causal power, see Molnar 2003. As 
they are used here, the idea of a disposition and causal power are understood to be a species of 
‘potentiality’ in the sense that Aristotle intended.   
11
 I take no stand here on the nature of “representational content”, i.e., whether it is to be 
understood ‘externally’ or ‘internally’ or through some combination thereof, and I take the idea 
of such content ‘coming to mind’ to be explicable through examples. The sense in which such 
content comes to mind in a capacity-specific way just is the relevant differences between, say, 
the ways in which imagination and memory present something to mind.    
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similar non-action event occurs. When the agent exerts effort in the 
performance of an action, it causes the initiation of the relevant bodily 
capacities; when effort is exerted by the agent in conditions of paralysis or 
failure of some kind, it causes an event of some kind or other that is not the 
action in question. Thus, in suitably normal conditions and when all goes 
well, the range of characteristic effects of the exertion of effort by the agent 
consists in the performance of an action, which is itself the initiation of 
bodily capacities by the agent and their sustained actualisation over time as 
the agent controls the relevant capacities. In abnormal conditions and when 
all does not go well, the exertion of effort by the agent initiates the onset of 
a non-action event, which need not be the actualisation of a bodily capacity 
by the agent. The effort in question distinguishes the active and passive 
relations in which an agent can stand with their capacities, it is present when 
an agent tries but fails to perform an action in cases of bodily paralysis, and 
it is what enables the agent to continue to perform an action in the presence 
of powerful desires that threaten to thwart their performance thereof. 
Crucially, such effort is something that the agent does or exerts, and it is 
thus something that we attribute directly to them, and so it cannot be 
reduced to or identified with the motivational factors that figure in the 
standard story of action.   
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In this paper, I have criticised what has come to be known as the 
standard story of action and presented an alternative account. The standard 
story depicts actions as events that are caused by and made intelligible 
through the appropriate combinations of the agent’s beliefs, desires, 
decisions, intentions, and other motivational factors. By introducing an 
example in which an agent displays strength of will in overcoming a 
persistent desire and belief that threaten an action that they are in the midst 
of performing, I argued that the standard story is problematic because it 
depicts the relation between the agent and their bodily actions as causally 
mediated by their motivational factors. On the alternative account that I 
presented, I claimed that whenever an agent performs a bodily action, they 
do so by exerting a distinctive kind of effort so as to initiate, sustain, and 
control their own bodily capacities, an essential feature of bodily action that 
cannot be reduced to or identified with the motivational factors that figure 
in the standard story of action.
12
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